Courts as Governors in the Internal Market?

Member state governments exercise considerable control over the delegation of competence to the European Union (EU). In addition, the EU relies on member state administrations to implement its policies. This gives Member States (MS) further leeway in interpreting and implementing EU competences. However, MS cannot simply ignore their obligations under European law. Through infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or through national courts and possible preliminary ruling proceedings, actors can sue for compliance with European law obligations. The project examines this judicial control of Member States' implementation of EU law using the example of case studies on three policies of the internal market (social security coordination, railroad policy and services directive) in Germany and France as well as selected other MS. It asks when actors activate judicial control and what difference this makes with respect to the implementation and enforcement of EU law, but also for the design of EU law obligations (‘competence’) themselves. 

Case law, which arises through judgments, specifies existing law and also changes it. Control thus has an effect on the shaping of competence. This is particularly true whenever empty compromises have only apparently resolved conflicts in the legislative process. De facto, their clarification is then delegated to courts, which must find an interpretation in case of dispute. A similar situation arises when laws are not reformed despite changed conditions, but their adaptation is implicitly entrusted to administrations and courts. 

This subproject analyzes the development towards an integration characterized by control, being the focus of the Research Unit (RU), with regard to the interaction of judicial control and the definition of competence. 

Project team:

Prof. Dr. Susanne K. Schmidt

Larissa Willamowski